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Comment  Henning Bohn
Debbie Lucas and Marvin Phaup present an excellent overview of how 
economists and policymakers should think about risk-  taking in the public 
sector. The ﬁ  rst part reviews the economic theory of risk sharing and of how 
risks are priced. The second part applies the principles of state-  contingent 
claims pricing to practical questions of budget accounting. I agree whole-
heartedly with the two main points: taking a systematic risk has a cost to 
the government, and the market value of such risks should be reﬂ  ected in 
the budget.
The theoretical part reviews state-  contingent claims pricing—the stan-
dard technical framework for pricing risks in ﬁ  nance—in a way that should 
be readable in policy circles. The key insights are that taking systematic risks 
is costly and that options are valuable. Lucas and Phaup also discuss how 
ﬁ  nance theory can be adapted to deal with realistically incomplete markets. 
The main lessons are that public policy can improve risk sharing and that 
well-  designed risk-  sharing policies can improve social welfare.
The applied part applies state-  contingent claims pricing to questions of 
budget accounting. The key points are that assets and liabilities should be 
valued at market, that cost- beneﬁ  t calculations should be based on economic 
opportunity cost, that costs should be recognized when they are accrued and 
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not when the cash outlays occur, and that costs and beneﬁ  ts to the govern-
ment should be distinguished from broader social cost and beneﬁ  ts. In a 
series of insightful applications, Lucas and Phaup demonstrate how these 
principles apply to the accounting for government activities that involve 
economic uncertainty—notably to loans and loan guarantees.
Because the chapter well summarizes the state of the art, I have no sub-
stantive disagreements. Hence, my comments dwell mostly on issues where 
the state of the art is unsatisfactory and on issues that may complement 
Lucas and Phaup’s exposition.
Incomplete Markets: A Challenge for Economic Theory
In the theory section, the least satisfactory topic is the pricing of risks 
when markets are incomplete. When market prices are readily available, the 
economics profession’s message for policymakers is clear and simple: use 
the market prices, and follow the market in distinguishing systematic from 
idiosyncratic (diversiﬁ  able) risks. When markets are incomplete, however, 
economists’ theoretical answers, as reviewed in the chapter, seem to be more 
a list of special cases, each requiring special considerations, than a set of 
general principles.
To evaluate a policy intervention in an incomplete markets environment, 
two questions are helpful to identify the economic issue at hand and to 
organize the list of special cases:
1.  What is the source of the market incompleteness?
2.  Does the government have a comparative advantage over the private 
sector in addressing this source of market incompleteness?
At a microeconomic level, the sources of the market incompleteness are 
mostly problems of asymmetric information—moral hazard and adverse 
selection. At the macroeconomic level, the source of market incomplete-
ness is often the inability of future generations to participate in ﬁ  nancial 
and insurance markets.
The question about comparative advantage helps clarify what is assumed 
about the government’s ability to address the problem—an important issue 
that is often not addressed explicitly in policy debates. If government inter-
vention faces the same information problems as the private sector, there is a 
strong case for using market prices, even when markets are incomplete. This 
may mean placing a zero value on a “security” with no private market.
A case for “adjustments” to market prices is much stronger if the gov-
ernment has an identiﬁ  able comparative advantage. For example, the gov-
ernment has enforcement powers through tax authorities, threats of crimi-
nal punishment, and a multitude of investigative and regulatory agencies. 
In some instances, this may give the government a comparative advan-
tage in collecting information and in suppressing moral hazard. In such 56        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
cases, the government’s production cost—the cost of producing superior 
information—is arguably the relevant marginal cost, contrary to Lucas and 
Phaup’s principle of using private cost as benchmark.
Macroeconomic Risks: Key Issues That Deserve More Attention
In the applied section, my main concern is that Lucas and Phaup devote 
most attention to microeconomic issues—the accounting for loans and credit 
guarantees—without suﬃciently alerting readers to huge macroeconomic 
risks for which the accounting is arguably much worse. The “elephants in 
the room” here are the public debt, the government’s commitments to Social 
Security and Medicare, and public employee pensions.
Public debt is commonly issued in the form of safe (default-  free) debt 
securities, which are safe for bondholders but hugely risky for the taxpayers 
who are liable for the debt service. The welfare implications are discussed 
in Bohn (2005, 2009). Brieﬂ  y, my analysis suggests that unless old people 
are intrinsically much more risk averse than younger cohorts, eﬃcient inter-
generational risk sharing calls for contingent debt—for obligations oﬀering 
returns that are sensitive to macroeconomic and demographic variables.
Lucas and Phaup argue in this context that “considerations of genera-
tional equity” may justify the use of below-  market risk-  free interest rates. 
This argument blurs the distinction between budget accounting and social 
optimality—a distinction the authors correctly emphasize elsewhere—and 
it needlessly undermines the principle of market pricing. Generational 
considerations do not invalidate standard principles: budget accounting 
should use market prices for both safe and risky claims, and welfare involves 
more than accounting. Regarding the latter, a straightforward application 
of Bohn (2005, 2009) implies that certain aggregate risks have social cost 
below their market prices—namely, risks to which future generations are less 
exposed than current market participants. Thus, if below-  market risk-  free 
rates were accepted for “equity” reasons, the same argument would justify 
below-  market risk premiums—but neither makes sense.
Turning to Social Security and Medicare, the accounting is much disputed. 
With cash ﬂ  ows approaching a trillion dollars and disputed obligations in 
the tens of trillions, these programs are so huge that the choice between 
trust fund accounting, uniﬁ  ed budget accounting, or accrual accounting 
swamps all other government accounting questions. Keeping two or more 
inconsistent sets of books is considered fraudulent in most areas of account-
ing. Yet, the US government is telling Social Security participants that their 
beneﬁ  ts are held in trust—appealing to trust fund accounting—while using 
uniﬁ  ed budget accounting for most ﬁ  scal decision making; and in the uniﬁ  ed 
budget, Social Security revenues are used to cover other expenditures.
Either accounting system would be internally consistent and therefore 
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rior to accrual accounting, because they ignore other government assets 
and liabilities. The US government is actually publishing accrual-  based 
ﬁ  nancial statements, namely in the annual Financial Report of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, a publication that has received remarkably little attention in the 
policy debate. United States government ﬁ  nancial statements are also in 
Bohn (1992)—consistently for 1947 to 1989, a period long enough to identify 
trends and to make intertemporal comparisons.
Pension promises to the government’s own civilian employees and to mili-
tary veterans should be less controversial than Social Security, because the 
government is acting as employer in this context. Hence, the same accounting 
principles as for private pension plans should apply. (One might quibble that 
military service is special, but unlike Social Security recipients, veterans have 
served the government.) Available estimates suggest that accrued employee 
and veterans pensions amount to 4 to 5 trillion dollars, or about as much 
as the public debt. Pension liabilities are ignored, however, in almost all 
accounts of government indebtedness. The notable exception is—again—
the Financial Report of the U.S. Government.
There are two broad arguments for accrual accounting in the public sec-
tor. First, public accounting is centrally about accountability to the public. 
Economists and the accounting profession should therefore insist that the 
government follows generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to 
the maximum extent possible. A host of mundane government account-
ing questions can be resolved straightforwardly by reference to how private 
companies account for similar activities. Accountability derives from the 
fact that the government cannot change the rules without changing the rules 
for everyone, which would be visible, costly, and time consuming. Secondly, 
accrual-  based debt and deﬁ  cit measures are more insightful for economic 
analysis than cash numbers. As explained in Bohn (1992), this applies espe-
cially in economies where citizens have property rights (so accruals matter) 
and governments must use distortionary taxes to extract resources from 
their residents.
The only area that may require an extension of private- sector accounting 
principles is the accounting for contributory pay-  as-  you-  go transfer sys-
tems. Because promised transfers are backed by future taxes—an exercise 
of sovereign power—they do not have a private- sector counterpart to which 
one could appeal for GAAP. Yet, the legalistic position that Social Secu-
rity and Medicare are not liabilities because Congress could abolish them 
instantly deﬁ  es economic reality. In this area, the ideal accounting standard 
is debatable (see Bohn [2007] for my preferred rules), but getting away from 
the current multiplicity of accounting systems is probably more important 
than the details.
A relevant distinction here is between oﬃcial government reporting 
and the analysis by outside economists. This is analogous to the relation-
ship between corporate accounting and the ﬁ  nancial analysts commu-58        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
nity. Whereas outside analysts may apply discretion and judgment for the 
interpretation, oﬃcial ﬁ  nancial reporting requires strict rules and consistent 
principles to ensure accountability in the government no less than in the 
corporate sector.
Three Examples
Three examples should help clarify the general accounting issues.
First, consider government holdings of marketable securities—say, cor-
porate stocks in the railroad retirement fund. Marketable securities are 
straightforward from a microeconomic perspective, because government 
production is not an issue and market prices are observed. There is no asym-
metric information. The main questions are normative and macroeconomic: 
what is the optimal policy? Should the government take systematic risk in 
security markets? These are standard questions of optimal asset liability 
management. One challenge is perhaps the intergenerational aspect: if gov-
ernment policy improves intergenerational risk sharing, a clever politician 
may argue that the risk reduction should be recognized ex ante as a cost 
reduction. This argument would, however, confuse accounting and welfare. 
Even if a government’s portfolio shift improves welfare, there is no reason 
not to value the portfolio at market prices.
Second, consider student loans. Student loans are a prime example of 
a government activity that poses microeconomic problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Market prices reﬂ  ect private lenders’ cost 
of collecting debts. The key economic question here is if the govern-
ment has a comparative advantage. Because tax authorities can withhold 
future tax refunds and threaten audits, one may suspect that the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) is more eﬀective in collecting debts than private 
debt collectors. If so, the accounting question reduces to when and how 
the government’s lower cost of producing information is recognized; 
and there is a good case for using the government’s “production cost” 
(probabilities of suﬀering defaults) to value student loans. Otherwise 
eﬃcient government lending would be discouraged. At market discount 
rates, negative subsidy rates are not implausible. They would simply re-
ﬂ  ect the government comparative advantage—monopoly power over 
enforcement tools.
Third, consider ﬂ  ood insurance. Flood insurance faces adverse selection 
problems like student loans but without government production. The main 
issues are therefore how to compute the subsidy and how to hold policy-
makers accountable in a timely manner when new subsidies are granted. 
In this example, Lucas and Phaup’s arguments for accrual accounting and 
for using market prices are impeccable and worth endorsing strongly. The 
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much more common than the securities and student loan examples (which I 
selected to raise objections). That is, for most applications, Lucas and Phaup 
are right on target.
What Is a Risk Premium?
The term “risk premium” is widely used but should be clariﬁ  ed to avoid 
confusion between true risk premiums and mere spreads between safe and 
risky interest rates. Consider a promised future payment X—say, on a stu-
dent loan. Let the actual payment x be distributed on [0,X] with expected 
value E[x]. The percentage diﬀerence between X and E[x] is known as the 
expected default rate, E[x]  (1 –  default rate)∗X. If r is the safe interest rate, 
the market value V of the promised payment can be expressed in terms of a 
“risk spread” over the safe interest rate as
V  X/ (1   r  risk spread).
Alternatively, the same value V can be written in terms of a risk 
premium as
V  E[x]/ (1   r  risk premium).
For diversiﬁ  able risks, asset pricing theory predicts a zero risk premium. 
Then, V equals the expected payment discounted at the safe rate. The risk 
spread is nonetheless positive whenever the expected default rate is nonzero.
For systematic risks, asset pricing theory speciﬁ  es that market values are 
obtained as expectation over state-  contingent payments weighted by an 
appropriate pricing kernel: V  E[u∗x], where u denotes the pricing kernel, 
and E[u]  1/ (1  r) is the safe discount factor. The value V can be expressed 
equivalently in terms of the covariance of payoﬀs and pricing kernel, V  
E[x]/ (1   r)  cov(u,x). Compared to the formula V  E[x]/ (1   r  risk 
premium), one ﬁ  nds that a positive or negative covariance implies a posi-
tive or negative risk premium. Again, the risk premium diﬀers from the risk 
spread whenever the default rate is nonzero.
For Lucas and Phaup’s examples, which are mostly in the area of gov-
ernment credit, I suspect that the systematic risks are quantitatively small 
compared to the uncertainty surrounding the respective default probabili-
ties. In the Chrysler bailout case, for example, the main issue is not how 
correlated Chrysler’s value is with aggregate US consumption or other 
risk factors but how likely it was ex ante that the various contingent claims 
would pay oﬀ. The central problem for practical budgeting is therefore 
to estimate default risks reliably and in a manipulation-  proof fashion. 
True risk premium would be more important for valuing macroeconomic 
risks (e.g., the risks implied by alternative pension or debt-  management 
policies).60        Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup
Conclusions
My discussant quibbles should not distract from the main message: Lucas 
and Phaup provide an excellent survey and convincing prescriptions for 
government budgeting that should be considered authoritative, especially in 
the areas of government credit and insurance. My main concerns are about 
the treatment of macroeconomic risks and about the lack of public account-
ability due to the US government’s parallel use of multiple and mutually 
inconsistent accounting systems.
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